How is it that both Judah and Assyria remember the War of 701 BCE when Sennacherib invaded Judah as their respective victories? Some have explained this by concluding that either Assyria or Judah is deceptive in their written accounts of the war. In this essay, by comparing this disputed victory with the much more recent War of 1812—where both sides say they won—I argue that neither Assyrian nor biblical texts were principally deceptive in their presentation of the war as their own victory. Similar to the War of 1812, both sides had reasons to see themselves as the victor in the conflict.
See also Sennacherib and the War of 1812: Disputed Victory in the Assyrian Campaign of 701 BCE in Light of Military History (T&T Clark, 2023).
By Paul S. Evans
McMaster Divinity College
February 2025
Introduction
The story of the invasion of Judah by the Assyrian king Sennacherib in 701 BCE when Hezekiah was king is a subject that continues to fascinate both students of the Bible and history buffs. What makes it so interesting is that not only it is told three times in the Bible (2 Kgs 18–19, Isa 36–37, and 2 Chr 32) we have multiple versions of Sennacherib’s own account of the invasion (Rassam Cylinder, Taylor Prism, Sennacherib Prism, Bull Inscriptions). What is more, there is an abundance of archaeological evidence relevant to the historical event as well. A destruction layer unearthed at Lachish is associated with Sennacherib’s invasion (Ussishkin 1988, 28–60; 2006, 339–358) and a massive relief from Sennacherib’s palace depicts the siege and conquest of Lachish (Uehlinger 2003, 221–305) which is also mentioned in the biblical text (2 Kgs 18:14). Furthermore, ubiquitous destruction layers in different Judahite sites from 701 BCE have been discovered in excavations (Stern 2001, 10).
What is amazing is that despite the abundance of evidence and so much scholarly work, there continue to be major debates concerning the historical reconstruction of the events of 701 BCE. One of the main reasons for continued debate is the startling differences between the biblical and Assyrian accounts. The biblical texts present Sennacherib’s invasion as ending in disaster, with his army taking significant losses (e.g., 2 Kgs 19:35). Assyrian annals on the other hand present the campaign as an unmitigated success. The contradiction between these two accounts has been well known since Sennacherib’s annals were first published in 1852 (Rawlinson 1852). The initial scholarly response to the differences was largely the determination that the Assyrian account is biased because they never acknowledged any defeats. According to Mayer, “This cut-and-dry explanation became the guiding force for all subsequent interpretation of Neo-Assyrian historical writings” (Mayer 2003, 169).
This assessment is a bit hyperbolic, however, as scholars wrestled with explaining Hezekiah’s payment of tribute (acknowledged in both the biblical and Assyrian sources) as congruent with an Assyrian defeat, despite many thinking that Assyrian sources were unwilling to concede loss. What is more, despite the early position that Assyrian sources could not be trusted, scholarly opinion shifted considerably on this issue. Today some scholars go as far as to say that “Assyrian royal inscriptions (nearly) never lie” (Knauf 2003, 141). Along these lines Baruch Halpern has put forward what he calls the “Tiglath-Pileser principle” which holds that Assyrian documents never outright lie, though they “put extreme spin on real events” (Halpern 2001, 124–32). Based on this privileging of Assyrian claims, Knauf views the Assyrian and biblical sources as irreconcilable and concludes that 2 Kgs 18–19 are “but a piece of propaganda” (Knauf 2003, 146). Lemche similarly opines that the biblical account “is invented history or simply fiction” (Lemche 2003, 153). Thus, for some when biblical claims contradict Assyrian claims, the former are deemed “invented,” “fiction,” or simply “propaganda.”
Of course, some scholars privilege the biblical text above all other sources and take the data from the Bible as historically reliable unless it has been otherwise disproved (Provan, Long, and Longman 2003). While not always stated, this approach seems based at least partly on a view of the text as inspired and therefore accurate. These, along with some other scholars (Laato 1995, 198-226), still hold to the early position that Assyrian sources do in fact purposefully deceive and not just put “spin” on events. Most scholars, I suspect would fall somewhere in the middle of these two positions. Regardless of which position is held, Cogan probably represents the general consensus when he asserts that after the Assyrian and biblical accounts are “pitted against one other” then “the unavoidable judgment [must be] made that some are more trustworthy than others” (Cogan 2014, 73). This essay, however, would like to set aside far-reaching claims or “principles” concerning the trustworthiness of either source and instead ask an important question. How can it be that both Assyrian and Judahite sources remember the war as their respective victories? To help answer this research question I will focus on a comparative from military history that could help shed some light on an answer: the War of 1812 between Canada and the United States.
1. The War of 1812
One of the most well-known aspects of the War of 1812 is the fact that both sides claim victory. The Americans think they won the war, while Canadians consider themselves the victors of the conflict. In fact, “Widely divergent national and local historiographies about the War of 1812 have been created on both sides of the Canadian/American border” (Forest 2012, 97). This makes the war of 1812 a great example of a disputed victory (not unlike the war of 701 BCE)!
A. U.S. Opinion
When it comes down to it, who won the war of 1812 depends upon who you ask. Americans of early 1815 (when the war ended) considered themselves the victors over their enemies for several reasons.
i. War Aims
The origins of the War of 1812 stem from British practices on the open seas against U.S. vessels during the Napoleonic War. Americans objected to the restrictions on U.S. trade enforced by a British naval blockade (Hickey 2012b, 2). Additionally, Americans protested the British practice of “impressment” wherein the British forcibly recruited sailors from U.S. vessels into the Royal Navy to address manpower shortages in their war with France. The U.S. had had enough and was ready to go to war over these issues.
Another motivation for war with Britain was the desire to maintain U.S. honor and its reputation (Heidler and Heidler 2002, 5). While multiple factors contributed to the start of the conflict, restoring American honor may have been the most significant. As Berton concludes, “America went to war as a last resort because her leaders felt that the nation’s honour had been besmirched to a point where any other action would be unthinkable” (Berton 1980, 24).
By the end of the war, the British naval blockades had ceased as did the practice of impressment. In reality, the end of these British practices was due to the end of the Napoleonic War, rather than due to American success in the War of 1812. But perception is more powerful than reality. Americans viewed the end of these practices as due to their achievements in the war and felt they had thereby reclaimed their honor.
ii. Memorable Battles
Victory was perceived by Americans by privileging the memory of certain successful battles over other less successful battles. Many could be mentioned here but I will note a few examples (cf. Evans 2023, 200–207). In April 1813, the Americans captured York, the provincial capital of Upper Canada (modern Toronto), and burned the legislative and other government buildings (Benn 1984). Although they withdrew several days later, this event marked a clear American victory with significant symbolic value due to the capture of the provincial capital. However, Canadians remember that in this battle Americans had a higher casualty count due to an explosion in the ammunition storeroom that caused 300 deaths, including the U.S. commander, Pike (Greenblatt 2003, 74–75).
Despite a significant loss in late August 1814 with the occupation and burning of Washington DC, Americans remember their success in the subsequent Battle of Baltimore. Baltimore was better prepared to defend itself than the capital (Greenblatt 2003, 106). Fort McHenry, located on the peninsula in front of the city, housed a garrison of 1,000 men. The commander, Major George Armistead, requested an enormous American flag to fly over the fort (Greenblatt 2003, 106). The British bombarded the fort with congreve rockets and cannonballs from their ships, but did minimal damage. On September 14, realizing their attack was not breaching the defenses, the British withdrew. This success has been immortalized in the national anthem, written during the British bombardment of Baltimore, recalling “‘the rockets’ red glare’ that showed the flag was still there at Baltimore” (Hattendorf 2013, 7).
ii. The Final Battle of the War
An American victory in the war of 1812 was also perceived due to the fact that the last battle in the war, the Battle of New Orleans, was an American victory. Even though the peace treaty of Ghent that ended the war was signed well before the battle, the news of the U.S. victory at New Orleans arrived in Washington ten days before news of the peace treaty. This sequence of events left Americans with the impression that the battle was a key catalyst in ending the war (Hickey 2012b, 121).
iii. No Loss of Land
An American victory was further perceived because the Americans did not lose any land in the war. While the British briefly occupied Washington DC, they eventually abandoned it. By the end of the war, all American territory held by the British was returned when peace was declared (Benn 2002, 47). Returning to antebellum borders was viewed as an American success.
iv. Intangible Benefits of the War
The situation after the war is remembered positively by Americans. In the aftermath of the war, Americans believed that their country was more respected as a result of the war, that it proved its strength and independence” (Turner 2000, 131). The Americans emerged from the war with notable victories, retention of all their territory, having won the final battle, gained a national anthem, and regained respect and prestige. These achievements might constitute an American victory by any definition.
B. Canadian Opinion
i. Failed U.S. War Aims
Canadians considered themselves victorious in the conflict for several reasons. First, since they believed the goal of the Americans was to conquer Canada, their failure suggested a Canadian victory (Turner 2000, 131). Canada was seen as an easy target, with Thomas Jefferson famously saying that “the acquisition of Canada” would be “a mere matter of marching.” In fact, it was the claim of these war aims upon which much recruitment for the war was often made. Andrew Jackson, for example, claimed the fight was for “the establishment of our national character” which would be achieved by the conquest of all the British dominions upon the continent of North America” (Greenblatt 2003, 63).
While this could be taken simply as rhetoric, these war aims were directly communicated to Canadians. On the front lines, American General William Hull issued a proclamation to the Canadians telling them that with the U.S. annexation of their lands they would “be emancipated from tyranny and oppression” (Laxer 2013, 139–142). In later peace negotiations, the Americans denied their aim to conquer Canada, but the British countered by pointing to Hull’s proclamation of Canada’s annexation. The American negotiators rebutted that it was “not really government-sanctioned” (Borneman 2004, 268). Whether or not the conquest of Canada was a true war aim for the U.S. is debated, but such aims were explicitly communicated to Canadians and this war aim was not achieved (Greenblatt 2003, 81).
ii. Memorable (and Memorialized Battles)
Like the Americans, Canadians privilege certain memories over others. For example, Canadians remember their successful invasion and occupation of the U.S. capital, Washington, DC, in August 1814. American successes in 1813 in York (Toronto), which included the burning of government buildings, were avenged in this campaign. Many government buildings were burned including the presidential palace. When the President’s home was rebuilt, the exterior walls were painted white to cover the burn marks, thus it became known as the White House (Turner 2000, 101). Taking the enemy’s capital city is symbolically important and is remembered by Canadians as a clear sign of their victory (Greenblatt 2003, 104).
iii. The Final Battle of the War
Canadians dismiss the U.S. victory in New Orleans because the war had actually ended before the battle took place. The peace treaty of Ghent was agreed upon and signed by both British and American diplomats on Christmas Eve, 1814. However, it took some time for the news to cross the Atlantic and reach the United States (Turner 2000, 106). The pivotal moment in the Battle of New Orleans, which led to the British defeat took place on January 8, 1815—some two weeks after the peace treaty was signed by both sides (Heidler and Heidler 2002, 10). From the Canadian perspective, winning a battle after the war had officially ended and the peace treaty was agreed upon hardly constitutes a victory. Therefore, the Battle of New Orleans doesn’t count.
iv. No Loss of Territory
Both Canadian and American perspectives of success partially relied on the fact that they did not lose any territory during the war. While both sides had gained territory throughout the conflict, the borders ultimately reverted to their antebellum state. For Canadians this was even more significant since it was the Americans who had aims to take Canadian territory but had failed.
v. Intangible Benefits of the War
The War of 1812 had a unifying effect on Canada. The small population of Upper Canada was quite diverse, consisting of immigrants from the British Isles and Ireland, as well as settlers from the U.S. The war, however, changed Canadians from “a loose aggregation of village states into something approaching a political entity” (Berton 1980, 28). Berton suggests that it was not the war itself, but rather “the myth of the war” that instilled a new sense of community awareness among Canadians. He writes:
In the end, the myth became the reality…. As the years went by and memories dimmed, as old scars healed and old grudges evaporated, as aging veterans reminisced and new leaders hyperbolized, the settlers began to believe that they had repelled the invader almost single-handed. For the first time, Upper Canadians shared a common tradition (Berton 1980, 28).
2. The War of 701 BCE
A. War Aims
Armed with analogies from the War of 1812, we now return to our research question of how both Assyria and Judah can remember the war of 701 BCE as their respective victories. From the Assyrian perspective, their essential war aims were viewed as accomplished. As in 1812, where U.S. war aims did not require the annexation of Canada, Assyrian war aims did not require the taking of Jerusalem, deporting its citizens, or deposing their king (Mayer 2003, 180). From their perspective Assyria was successful in achieving their essential goals. The Assyrians established the setting for enriching their empire: the pacification of the western rebels would lead to the economic flourishing of the region—the Pax Assyriaca (Fales 2008).
However, Judah had a different opinion in this regard. The stated war aims of Assyria as remembered from the words of the Rabshakeh (2 Kgs 18:19–35) were not accomplished: the destruction of the land of Judah (18:25); the taking of Jerusalem (18:30, 35) through a long siege (18:27); and the deportation of Jerusalem’s inhabitants (18:32). Remember here that we are talking about Judah’s perception of Assyrian goals. Judean perceptions were likely also informed by known Assyrian policy to depose rebel rulers and to place a new pro-Assyrian king on the throne (e.g., Sennacherib’s annals note his deposing of Lulli, the king of Sidon and his replacing him with a new king, Tabalu; e.g., COS 2.119B:302). Since Hezekiah remained king in Judah despite his rebellion, Judah thought they won. (Perhaps true Assyrian war aims were not the same as those communicated by Assyrian emissaries, similar to how the U.S. general Hull told Canadians that the U.S. intended to conquer Canada, but true U.S. war aims may not have required such conquest).
B. Significance of the Capital City
Similar to how Canadians viewed the burning of Washington DC as more important than the defense of Baltimore, Judah likely viewed Jerusalem’s survival as more significant than the loss of Lachish—if you did not take Jerusalem, you did not win the war. Similar to the American perspective that viewed the defense of Baltimore as more significant than the loss of Washington, the Assyrians viewed the failure to take Jerusalem as inconsequential (Knauf 2003, 146). The taking of Lachish, on the other hand, was a point of Assyrian pride (as seen in how a relief of the siege of Lachish decorated Sennacherib’s palace). The destruction of Lachish was all that was needed to compel Hezekiah to submit and pay the required tribute.
C. No Loss of Territory
The issue of territorial loss in 701 BCE is unclear in the sources. In his annals Sennacherib claims to have redistributed parts of Hezekiah’s territory and put them under Philistine control (RINAP 3.1:176, 22.iii.31). However, Assyrian texts do not list the exact cities and it is not clear if this might be “re-patriated” territory rather than Judahite territory proper. The biblical account extols Hezekiah for expanding his kingdom at Philistia’s expense, as 2 Kgs 18:8 reads: “From watchtower to fortified city, [Hezekiah] defeated the Philistines, as far as Gaza and its territory.” In Sennacherib’s annals the king of Gaza is mentioned as a recipient of some of Hezekiah’s cities that Sennacherib claims to have despoiled. It is possible that the cities in question were none other than Philistine cities. Thus, some of the territory put under Philistine control in the aftermath of Sennacherib’s campaign could have been more of a restoration of Philistine territory rather than loss of Judean territory proper (Gallagher 1999, 110). What is more, given that the border between Judah and Philistia was somewhat fluid throughout Israel’s history and moved back and forth somewhat throughout their co-existence (Dever 2017, 317–330), loss of such territory could be easily rationalized away.
D. The Final Battle of the War
Furthermore, the significance of success in the final battle of a war was crucial in determining victory. As we have seen, in the War of 1812, the U.S. claimed the last major victory at New Orleans (though Canadians dismiss that victory). Similarly, Judahites perceived Assyria to have lost the last conflict of the war, likely against the Nubian-Egyptian forces at Eltekeh, which was interpreted as Yahweh’s direct defeat of the enemy (Evans 2009, 177–179). Assyrians, however, might have disregarded the significance of a loss or setback at Eltekeh, as some scholars have suggested, and viewed their main goals as achieved nonetheless (Matty 2016, 46).
E. Aftermath of the War
The archaeological evidence shows widespread destruction in Judah left by the Assyrian campaign in 701 BCE which might support the view that Assyria won the war. One might therefore ask how Judah could think the war a victory in light of such devastation and economic hardship. Once again the comparison with the War of 1812 is instructive. The War of 1812 brought hardship for both Americans and Canadians (Hickey 2012a, 69), hitting farmers especially hard. In Canada, American incursions west of the grand River “destroyed virtually all of that area’s resources” (Turner 2000, 111). The war further caused significant inflation, resulting in “hardships for the poor” (Benn 2002, 78). Despite the devastating effects, the war became a rallying point for Canadian identity. It unified the diverse population, and the myth of the war fostered a new sense of community awareness (Berton 1980, 28).
From this comparative perspective, then, we can see that devastation and economic hardship is part and parcel of war but does not preclude viewing a war as having a positive outcome. In light of this reality, the notion that the war of 701 BCE, despite the hardships suffered, may yet have functioned to stir up a “patriotic” nationalistic perspective in Judah is not problematic. Besides that, the archaeological evidence reveals that the devastation in Judah was not total, with some areas having only minor destructions or escaping completely unscathed (Faust 2008). In fact, recent studies have shown that Judah’s population zenith actually came after Sennacherib’s withdrawal and that there was significant growth and expansion soon after in the early seventh century BCE. It seems likely that the prosperity of Judah that followed Sennacherib’s withdrawal contributed to the Judahite view that the war was a success. While many scholars often attribute Judah’s growth and expansion following 701 BCE to the Pax Assyriaca, Judahites likely did not (Fantalkin 2004). Success is success. The growth and prosperity that followed the Assyrian withdrawal would have been interpreted by Judah as due to Hezekiah’s successful rebellion. In their perspective Hezekiah’s bold rebellion paid off. Judah won the war.
F. Intangible Benefits
In Assyria, the campaign was remembered fondly as seen in the production of its annalistic account recounting its memorable victorious battles (where Sennacherib himself apprehended princes’ and kings’ chariots) (RINAP 3.1:176, 22.iii.3–5) and the submission of foreign rulers to his majesty. Clearly Assyria felt renewed pride and prestige in light of the campaign as evinced in the decoration of Sennacherib’s palace with a relief depicting the siege of Lachish to impress those who visited the king.
Similar to the intangible benefits detailed regarding the War of 1812, the survival of Judah validated Yahwism (which was denigrated under the previous king, Ahaz), led to increased antipathy toward Assyria (as evinced in negative prophetic oracles like Nahum), and led to memories of Hezekiah’s faithful leadership during the Assyrian crisis, with the story recounted three times in the Bible.
Conclusion
In conclusion, comparing perspectives on the War of 1812 with those of the war of 701 BCE suggests neither Assyrian nor biblical texts were principally deceptive in their presentation of the war as their own victory. Similar to the War of 1812, both sides had reasons to see themselves as the victor in the conflict (Kuhrt 2010, 2:478).
American newspapers drew comparisons between the U.S. success in the War of 1812 and the achievements of the U.S. war of Independence. The New York National Advocate referenced it as “This second war of independence,” which it viewed as “illustrated by more splendid achievements than the war of the revolution” (Hickey 2012b, 113). Similarly, when the biblical history was compiled, Hezekiah’s achievements were compared to those of David (2 Kgs 18:3), the king who secured Israel’s independence from Philistia. The Assyrian crisis passed into Judahite history not as a “futile and costly struggle” in which Judah “had barely escaped defeat” but as a “a glorious triumph” (Hickey 2012b, 121) in which the God of this small nation had repulsed the great Empire and shown himself to be more powerful than Sennacherib or his gods.
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