What is Phenomenology? How do we approach this question? Do we examine the use of the term Phenomenology in the history of Philosophy: Hegel, Husserl, and/or Heidegger?
Etymologically, for those who invented the word as a neologism, Phenomenology implied a discourse of what shows itself (from Greek phainómenon "that which appears" and lógos "study"). This refines our pursuit, but at the same time tells us very little. We may have some thoughts on logos as "discourse" and "study," but what does it mean for something "to show itself?" We say, for instance, "he shows himself to be a coward," but in what sense is "cowardice" showing itself in this example?
Perhaps we can approach this in the "privative." Heraclitus says "physis kryptesthai philei:" Being loves to hide. But if being loves to hide, how does this help us examine "that which shows itself," the phainómenon of Phenomenology that the lógos or discourse is going to be about?
If Being loves to hide, and we are talking about disclosing something out of hiddeness, is there a concept that will help us to reconcile these apparently contrary notions? In ancient Greek, the word they created as a neologism to express the concept of Truth is "A-letheia": un-hidden, dis-close, un-cover, re-veal. So there is going to be something about truth, at least as the Greeks experienced it, which will be an un-covering. But how are we to understand this? Perhaps we need to go back to the beginning and start over in "Phenomenological Kindergarten."
Heidegger says we go to Phenomenological Kindergarten when we consider for the first time things like the idea that a torn sock is better than an un-torn one. In the tearing, the "unity" of a previously un-torn sock is produced or dis-closed (a-letheia, un-covered), precisely "as a lost unity." Thus, the Category of Unity as a determination of the Being of a sock is not simply abstracted to, but is phenomenologically produced. In this way, part of the Being (in this case, unity) of this entity (the untorn sock) is re-vealed (a-letheia, un-hidden) in the tearing.
So, in “Four Seminars” Heidegger invites us to Phenomenological Kindergarten to consider how a torn sock is better than a mended one because in the tearing, the prior unity of the sock that we didn’t consider is "forced" to the surface, precisely as a lost unity (Heidegger, Four Seminars, 11).
But perhaps people don't want to go back to the beginning? People say: I am too far advanced to bother with the Basic Concepts, the grundbegriffe as German says. I would suggest that the fundamentals love to cover themselves up, so each age must begin again to try to discover how far they have fallen from the question of the meaning of Being, and how their forgetfulness of Being stands with the essence of their age. Heidegger wants to rekindle "a battle of the giants" concerning Being (cf. Plato's Sophist, 245e6-246e1). The question of Being enflamed the Philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, but since has been covered up and forgotten. In the last Philosophical system, Hegel's, the history of ontology is realized where the Being of beings becomes the most all encompassing concept, and hence also the most empty. In Being and Time, Heidegger undergoes an analysis of the history of ontology (destruction) to reawaken what lies hidden and dormant in that approach. For Heidegger's conclusion regarding the innermost Being of that entity which we ourselves are, see my blog post here: http://palpatinesway.blogspot.com/2018/10/heidegger-and-tragic-interpre…
What is Phenomenology? How do we approach this question? Do we examine the use of the term Phenomenology in the history of Philosophy: Hegel, Husserl, and/or Heidegger?
Etymologically, for those who invented the word as a neologism, Phenomenology implied a discourse of what shows itself (from Greek phainómenon "that which appears" and lógos "study"). This refines our pursuit, but at the same time tells us very little. We may have some thoughts on logos as "discourse" and "study," but what does it mean for something "to show itself?" We say, for instance, "he shows himself to be a coward," but in what sense is "cowardice" showing itself in this example?
Perhaps we can approach this in the "privative." Heraclitus says "physis kryptesthai philei:" Being loves to hide. But if being loves to hide, how does this help us examine "that which shows itself," the phainómenon of Phenomenology that the lógos or discourse is going to be about?
If Being loves to hide, and we are talking about disclosing something out of hiddeness, is there a concept that will help us to reconcile these apparently contrary notions? In ancient Greek, the word they created as a neologism to express the concept of Truth is "A-letheia": un-hidden, dis-close, un-cover, re-veal. So there is going to be something about truth, at least as the Greeks experienced it, which will be an un-covering. But how are we to understand this? Perhaps we need to go back to the beginning and start over in "Phenomenological Kindergarten."
Heidegger says we go to Phenomenological Kindergarten when we consider for the first time things like the idea that a torn sock is better than an un-torn one. In the tearing, the "unity" of a previously un-torn sock is produced or dis-closed (a-letheia, un-covered), precisely "as a lost unity." Thus, the Category of Unity as a determination of the Being of a sock is not simply abstracted to, but is phenomenologically produced. In this way, part of the Being (in this case, unity) of this entity (the untorn sock) is re-vealed (a-letheia, un-hidden) in the tearing.
So, in “Four Seminars” Heidegger invites us to Phenomenological Kindergarten to consider how a torn sock is better than a mended one because in the tearing, the prior unity of the sock that we didn’t consider is "forced" to the surface, precisely as a lost unity (Heidegger, Four Seminars, 11).
But perhaps people don't want to go back to the beginning? People say: I am too far advanced to bother with the Basic Concepts, the grundbegriffe as German says. I would suggest that the fundamentals love to cover themselves up, so each age must begin again to try to discover how far they have fallen from the question of the meaning of Being, and how their forgetfulness of Being stands with the essence of their age. Heidegger wants to rekindle "a battle of the giants" concerning Being (cf. Plato's Sophist, 245e6-246e1). The question of Being enflamed the Philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, but since has been covered up and forgotten. In the last Philosophical system, Hegel's, the history of ontology is realized where the Being of beings becomes the most all encompassing concept, and hence also the most empty. In Being and Time, Heidegger undergoes an analysis of the history of ontology (destruction) to reawaken what lies hidden and dormant in that approach. For Heidegger's conclusion regarding the innermost Being of that entity which we ourselves are, see my blog post here: http://palpatinesway.blogspot.com/2018/10/heidegger-and-tragic-interpre…